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The Gate is Wide Open: Should There Be a
Limit to Judicial Discretion in




A seemingly innocent request1 from a neighboring resident resulted
in the tragic death of six-year-old Megan Kanka.2 Unbeknowst to the
Kanka family, the neighboring resident was twice-convicted child
molester, Jimmy Timmendequas.3 In response to this unconscionable
event, the New Jersey legislature enacted sex registration and notification
laws in 1994, laws which have routinely been referred to as Megan's
Law.4 Soon thereafter, in 1996, the Clinton Administration enacted a
federal version of Megan's Law.5 As of the date of this Comment, all
fifty states have enacted a form of Megan's Law to protect the public
from potential recidivist sexually violent predator behavior.6
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, 2007; B.A., Economics, Dickinson College summa cum laude, 2004. The
author wishes to thank her parents for their continued love, support, and encouragement.
In addition, special thanks are given to Judge Mitchell S. Goldberg for the clerking
opportunity and Professor Michael A. Mogill for his thoughtful suggestions.
1. Robert J. Martin, Pursuing Public Protection Through Mandatory Community
Notification of Convicted Sex Offenders: The Trials and Tribulations of Megan's Law, 6
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 29, 32 (1996). Timmendequas allegedly used a new puppy dog to
entice Megan to come into his house. Id.
2. Kathleen V. Heaphy, Comment, Megan's Law: Protecting the Vulnerable or




5. Susan (Deschler) Oakes, Comment, Megan's Law: Analysis of Whether it's
Constitutional to Notify the Public of Sex Offenders Via the Internet, 17 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 1133, 1139 (1999).
6. Maureen S. Hopbell, Balancing the Protection of Children Against the
Protection of Constitutional Rights: The Past, Present and Future of Megan's Law, 42
DUQ. L. REv. 331, 339-40 (2004); see, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9791(b) (2005).
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In all likelihood, it is uncommon for people other than judges,
lawyers, victims, and offenders to consider how an offender is designated
a sexually violent predator. Because society as a whole will most likely
not question a sexually violent predator label, which will follow the
offender for the rest of his or her life, 7 it is critical for the legal system to
correctly determine this designation. Upon being labeled a sexually
violent predator, every time an offender relocates, the offender is
required to register with the local police authority, who then notifies the
surrounding community of the offender's prior behavior.' With the
widespread use of the Internet, offenders' information is now published
online in the majority of states.9 In effect, a "sexually violent predator"
designation stigmatizes the offender for the rest of his or her life.' 0 This
designation relies, in large part, upon the testimony of the district
attorney's expert witness.'
Two Pennsylvania cases have addressed the issue of whether it is
proper for an expert's sexually violent predator determination to be based
upon unproven allegations. 12 Unproven allegations are those that have
not been determined by a jury and that are: 1) not established by the
factual basis for a guilty plea, and 2) not supported by the nature of the
charges to which the defendant has pled guilty. 13 In both cases, the
defendant consistently denied the unproven allegations.
14
In Commonwealth v. Krouse, the defendant pled guilty to one count
of indecent assault.' 5 In the pre-sentence report, the defendant denied
developing feelings for and having a sexual relationship with the
victim. 6 The expert's opinion testimony, which concluded that Krouse
7. Commonwealth v. Williams, 733 A.2d 593, 607 (Pa. 1999). "[Sexually Violent
Predator] status carries with it serious, life-long repercussions which can put into
jeopardy a person's domestic tranquility and personal relationships." Id.
8. Hopbell, supra note 6, at 340-41.
9. Id. at 341-42.
10. Williams, 733 A.2d at 607.
11. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9795.4(b) (2005); Commonwealth v. Krouse, 799 A.2d
835, 840-43 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (noting that a sexually violent predator designation
involves a subjective assessment by the expert witness of the offender's potential future
dangerousness, which includes a greater risk of error than objective determinations).
12. Commonwealth v. Leddington, No. 01-06221, slip op. at 8 (Pa. C.P. Bucks Aug.
8, 2005); Krouse, 799 A.2d at 843-47 (Bowes, J., concurring).
13. Krouse, 799 A.2d at 845 (Bowes, J., concurring).
14. Id. at 844-45; Leddington, No. 01-06221, slip op. at 8.
15. Krouse, 799 A.2d at 836. In general, a person is guilty of indecent assault if the
person engages in non-consensual, forced (or the threat of force that would prevent
resistance by a person of reasonable resolution) compulsion against another whom the
person knows is unconscious or whom the person knows is unaware that the indecent
contact is occurring. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3126 (2005). The victim must be less
than thirteen years old or must be less than sixteen years old and the offender must be
four or more years older than the victim and not married to the victim. Id.
16. Krouse, 799 A.2d at 846 (Bowes, J., concurring).
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was a sexually violent predator, relied in large part on unproven charges
of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse that included allegations of oral
sex that were nol prossed.17 Thus, the expert's opinion testimony was
based on unproven allegations that were not introduced into evidence and
were consistently denied by the defendant.' 8  The Superior Court
reversed Krouse's sexually violent predator designation. 19  In so
concluding, the majority found insufficient evidence in addition to some
statutory factors that weighed against classifying Krouse as a sexually
violent predator.2 ° Judge Bowes' concurring opinion agreed with the
majority's conclusion that the evidence did not clearly and convincingly
establish that Krouse was a sexually violent predator.2' Judge Bowes'
opinion emphasized that Krouse's sexually violent predator
determination, based primarily upon unreliable hearsay, could not
stand.22
Similar to the factual scenario in Krouse, in Commonwealth v.
Leddington, the expert's opinion testimony was based, in large part, upon
unproven allegations contained in the police report and the probable
cause affidavit. 23 The expert's opinion was that Leddington threatened
his victim after the molestation, and assaulted another young girl at the
same party that evening. 4 Judge Goldberg ruled that these allegations of
the defendant's behavior were premised on unreliable hearsay since the
evidence was not introduced into the record and the allegations were
consistently denied.25 Thus, the trial court discounted those portions of
the expert's testimony in determining Leddington's sexually violent
predator status.26
This Comment analyzes whether experts in Pennsylvania's Megan's
Law hearings should be allowed to rely on law enforcement reports
and/or probable cause affidavits that contain unproven allegations in
17. Id. In effect, the charges of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse were dropped
against the defendant. See id.
18. Id. at 844.
19. Id. at 842 (majority opinion).
20. Id. at 839-42.
21. Krouse, 799 A.2d at 844 (Bowes, J., concurring).
22. See id. at 845-46; GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 12.2 (3d ed. 1996). "To constitute hearsay, the repeated statement must be
offered for the purpose of proving that what the declarant said is true-just as if the
declarant were on the witness stand, giving testimony that the proponent wants the trier to
believe." Id. at 208-09.
23. Commonwealth v. Leddington, No. 01-06221, slip op. at 8, 12 (Pa. C.P. Bucks
Aug. 8, 2005) (granting defendant's motion in limine to strike expert's opinion regarding
allegations of threats and an assault of second victim).
24. Id. at 8.
25. Id. at 12; Laurie Mason, Molester Labeled a Violent Predator, BUCKS COUNTY
COURIER TIMES, Aug. 10, 2005, at LA.
26. Leddington, No. 01-06221, slip op. at 12.
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determining a sexually violent predator designation. Part II discusses the
permissible bases of expert testimony in Pennsylvania generally, and
more specifically, within the Megan's Law context. In addition, Part II
explores how a sexually violent predator is designated as such in
Pennsylvania and what is typically relied upon by experts in both
Pennsylvania and in other jurisdictions. Part II also addresses the
implications of the confrontation clause in the Megan's Law context.
Part III argues that regardless of what experts typically rely upon, it
remains within the trial judge's discretion to determine whether the bases
of expert opinion testimony are reliable. Nevertheless, Part III suggests
that Pennsylvania should require the underlying bases of an expert's
testimony in a Megan's Law proceeding to satisfy a factor analysis test.
This procedural mechanism will prevent an erroneous sexually violent
predator designation so that stigmatizing effects are limited to those
offenders who truly deserve such a label.
II. Background
A. Basis of an Expert's Opinion According to the Pennsylvania Rules
of Evidence
Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 703 allows an expert to base his or
her opinion on a police report and/or a probable cause affidavit, provided
it is evidence "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
particular field., 27  Historically, experts were limited to basing their
opinions on firsthand knowledge or on trial records.2 8 In accordance
with Federal Rule of Evidence 703, Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 703
has liberalized the permissible bases for an expert's opinion. 29  In
Commonwealth v. Thomas, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted a
rule that allows a medical expert witness to offer an opinion that is based,
in part, on otherwise inadmissible hearsay if any expert in the practice of
the expert's profession customarily relies on it.30 Thus, the Thomas court
took the first step, in the medical context, toward expanding the
permissible bases of expert opinion testimony.3'
27. PA. R. EVID. 703. The standard set forth in this rule applies in both the criminal
and civil context. Id.
28. See Collins v. Hand, 246 A.2d 398,404 (Pa. 1968).
29. FED. R. EvID. 703; see Commonwealth v. Thomas, 282 A.2d 693, 698-99 (Pa.
1971).
30. Thomas, 282 A.2d at 698-99.
31. Id. See also, e.g., Commonwealth v. Daniels, 390 A.2d 172, 175-78 (Pa. 1978)
(admitting opinion testimony in a voluntary manslaughter conviction case based, in part,
upon a letter from and a conversation with a doctor); Jumper v. Jumper, 362 A.2d 411,
413-14 (Pa. 1976) (admitting testimony from a psychiatrist based, in part, upon reports of
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Even though the permissible bases of an expert's opinion have
expanded, the underlying facts or data used to reach that opinion must
still be reliable. 32 This determination of whether underlying facts or data
are of the type "reasonably relied upon" by experts in the subject field
pursuant to Rule 703 is a preliminary question for the trial judge.33
Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 703 anticipates the trial judge
determining the following: "whether the underlying facts are of the type
of data upon which experts in the pertinent field reasonably rely upon in
forming opinions outside of the litigation process, whether the testifying
expert relied upon those facts, and whether it is reasonable for testifying
experts to do So.
'34
Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 703 is certainly not divorced from
its companion Rule of Evidence 705, which requires disclosure (rather
than admission) 35 of the factual bases of an expert's conclusions. 36 Thus,
since an expert can rely on the truth of out-of-court sources, 37 and must
name or disclose those sources,38 an expert may rely on hearsay in
reaching his or her opinion. Nevertheless, an expert must ground his or
her opinion on reliable data.39 Thus, it remains within the trial judge's
discretion to determine whether expert testimony is admissible, that is,
whether the bases relied upon by an expert in reaching his or her opinion
are reliable.4 °
B. Scope of Permissible Bases for Expert Opinion in Pennsylvania
Consistent with Commonwealth v. Thomas, Pennsylvania Rules of
Evidence 703 and 705 are used in various contexts to permit an expert to
rely on an array of information that has been determined by trial courts to
persons who had observed the defendant over a long period of time and upon discussions
with members of the mental hospital staff); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 369 A.2d 471,
474-76 (Pa. 1976) (admitting opinion of surgeon based, in part, upon consultation with a
radiologist and an examination of x-ray films that radiologist purportedly took of the
defendant).
32. Am. Universal Ins. Co. v. Falzone, 644 F.2d 65, 66 (1st Cir. 1981).
33. Edward W. Ohlbaum, Ohlbaum on the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence § 703.09
(2005).
34. Id.
35. PA. R. EvID. 705. Rule 705 differs markedly from FED. R. EVID. 705 in that an
expert is required, pursuant to Pennsylvania law, to disclose the bases of his or her
opinion. PA. R. EVD. 705 Cmt. "The salient facts must be in the record so that the jury
may evaluate the opinion." Id.
36. PA. R. EVID. 705.
37. PA. R. EvID. 703.
38. See supra text accompanying note 35.
39. Emigh v. Consol. Rail Corp., 710 F. Supp. 608, 612 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
40. Primavera v. Celotex Corp., 608 A.2d 515, 521 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
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be reliable. 41  Although experts are typically given wide latitude in
determining the bases of their opinion testimony, it is certainly not the
case that experts have free range to base opinion testimony on inherently
unreliable information.42 For example, in Primavera v. Celotex Corp.,43
the evidence at issue was medical reports prepared by doctors who did
not testify.44 The Superior Court concluded that the trial court properly
permitted the testifying experts to rely on the disputed reports of the non-
testifying specialists. 45 The court emphasized that "an 'expert' should
not be permitted simply to repeat another's opinion or data without
bringing to bear on it his own expertise and judgment. 4 6 In effect, the
expert's opinion should not be used as a back door to admit otherwise
inadmissible hearsay evidence since "the non-testifying expert is not on
the witness stand and truly is unavailable for cross-examination. 47
41. Commonwealth v. Thomas, 282 A.2d 693 (Pa. 1971). Expert reliance on a
variety of sources may be permissible despite the fact that these sources constitute
hearsay. See PA. R. EVID. 703; PA. R. EVID. 705. See also, e.g., Satler v. Commonwealth
Dep't of Transp., 670 A.2d 1205, 1207 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996) (permitting a medical
doctor to rely on notes of a certified registered nurse in forming an opinion); Cacurak v.
St. Francis Med. Ctr., 823 A.2d 159, 172-73 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) ("The [medical and
psychological] records need to be of the kind that are customarily relied upon by
[vocational] experts in [the] profession." The applicability of the rule depends upon the
circumstances of each case, and demands that the trial court exercise its sound
discretion.); In re Glosser Bros., Inc., 555 A.2d 129, 140-42 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989)
(permitting a stock valuation expert to rely on appraisal reports); Maravich v. Maravich,
504 A.2d 896, 900-01 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (permitting a fire marshal to rely on
information supplied by firefighters under his supervision); Garrett v. Standard Fire Ins.
Co., 541 S.W.2d 635, 637 (Tex. App. 1976) (permitting a fire investigator to base his
opinion on the start of a fire on his conversations with fellow firefighters present during
the fire); Maravich, 504 A.2d at 900 (citing Steinhauer v. Wilson, 485 A.2d 477, 479 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1984)) (permitting a construction expert to base cost estimates on figures
provided by various contractors with whom he had consulted, even though the figures
were not in the record); In re Glosser Bros., Inc., 555 A.2d at 140-42 (citing Bolus v.
United Penn Bank, 525 A.2d 1215, 1227 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987)) (permitting an accountant
to rely on tax returns and financial statements in computing lost profits); In re Glosser
Bros., Inc., 555 A.2d at 140-41 (citing Pittsburgh Outdoor Adver. Corp. Appeal, 272
A.2d 163, 166 (Pa. 1970)) (permitting valuation experts in eminent domain proceedings
to base their opinions on appraisals performed by others who are not called to testify as to
their appraisals).
42. Primavera v. Celotex Corp., 608 A.2d 515, 521 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992). "The
applicability of the rule permitting experts to express opinions relying on extrajudicial
data depends on the circumstances of the particular case and demands the exercise, like
the admission of all expert testimony, of the sound discretion of the trial court." Id. See
also Emigh v. Consol. Rail Corp., 710 F. Supp. 608, 612 (W.D. Pa. 1989). "An expert
must ground their opinion on reliable data." Id.
43. Primavera, 608 A.2d at 517.
44. Id. at 518.
45. Id. at 526.
46. Id. at 521.
47. Id. at 521-22.
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C. The Sexually Violent Predator Determination in Pennsylvania
Under Megan's Law
Pennsylvania's first Megan's Law was codified in 1995.48 Megan's
Law I detailed the process by which an individual was determined to be a
sexually violent predator.49 Post-conviction, the trial court ordered the
Assessment Board to evaluate the defendant and determine the
appropriateness of a sexually violent predator classification. 50  The
administrative officer of the Assessment Board assigned one of its
members to conduct the assessment pursuant to Section 9795.4(b) of the
Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes. 51 The trial court then held a hearing
to determine whether the defendant satisfied the criteria set forth in
Section 9795.4(b).52 Under Megan's Law I, the offender bore the burden
48. Debra Todd, Sentencing of Adult Offenders in Cases Involving Sexual Abuse of
Children: Too Little Too Late? A View from the Pennsylvania Bench, 109 PENN ST. L.
REv. 487, 530 (2004).
49. Id. at 531.
50. Commonwealth v. Krouse, 799 A.2d 835, 838 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002); 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 9799.3(a) (2005). See also http://www.pameganslaw.state.pa.us/ (follow
"Sexual Offenders Assessment Board" hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 15, 2005). The
Sexual Offenders Assessment Board "is an independent board of psychiatrists,
psychologists, and criminal justice experts appointed by the Governor, according to
statute, to assess all sex offenders convicted under ... Megan's Law." Id.
51. Krouse, 799 A.2d at 838.
52. Id. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9795.4(e) (2005). In a Megan's Law hearing, the
expert uses the following criteria to evaluate whether the defendant should be labeled a
sexually violent predator:
(1) Facts of the current offense, including:
(i) Whether the offense involved multiple victims.
(ii) Whether the individual exceeded the means necessary to achieve the
offense.
(iii) The nature of the sexual contact with the victim.
(iv) Relationship of the individual to the victim.
(v) Age of the victim.
(vi) Whether the offense included a display of unusual cruelty by the
individual during the commission of the crime.
(vii) The mental capacity of the victim.
(2) Prior offense history, including:
(i) The individual's prior criminal record.
(ii) Whether the individual completed any prior sentences.
(iii) Whether the individual participated in available programs for sexual
offenders.
(3) Characteristics of the individual, including:
(i) Age of the individual.
(ii) Use of illegal drugs by the individual.
(iii) Any mental illness, mental disability or mental abnormality.
(iv) Behavioral characteristics that contribute to the individual's conduct.
(4) Factors that are supported in a sexual offender assessment filed as criteria
reasonably related to the risk of reoffense.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9795.4(b) (2005).
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of rebutting by clear and convincing evidence the presumption of being
designated a sexually violent predator.5 3 The legislative policy behind
Megan's Law I was to identify offenders that exemplified recidivist
characteristics to enhance community protection.54
Although the underlying policy of Megan's Law I survived to
present day, Megan's Law II, as currently codified, involves a significant
change.55 Under Megan's Law II, an offender is no longer presumed to
be a sexually violent predator.56 In contrast, "[a]t the hearing prior to
sentencing, the court shall determine whether the Commonwealth has
proved by clear and convincing evidence that the individual is [a
sexually violent predator]. 57 Now, the Commonwealth bears the burden
of proving that the offender is a sexually violent predator.58 Ultimately,
"it is the trial court that has sole authority to determine a defendant to be
a sexually violent predator."
59
The change in Megan's Law II as compared to Megan's Law I is
significant for a variety of reasons. For one, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court concluded that Megan's Law I failed Fourteenth Amendment
scrutiny because the statute placed the burden on the offender to prove
that he or she was not a sexually violent predator. 60 In addition, persons
designated as sexually violent predators must now undergo lifetime
treatment, which includes notification, registration, and counseling
procedures, rather than an automatic increased maximum imprisonment
term as was the case under Megan's Law 1.61 Failure to comply with the
aforementioned lifetime treatment procedures is penalized by
imprisonment or probation. 62 Megan's Law II sought to rectify the
shortcomings of Megan's Law I by entitling the defendant to the "'full
panoply of relevant protections which due process guarantees,' including
a presumption of innocence." 63 These recent changes to Megan's Law
evidence its dynamism; even today, constitutional challenges to Megan's
64Law are ongoing.
53. Todd, supra note 48, at 531.
54. Id. at 532; 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9792 (2005).
55. Todd, supra note 48, at 532; see also 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9793(b) (2005).
56. Todd, supra note 48, at 532.
57. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9795.4(e)(3) (2005).
58. Id.
59. Commonwealth v. Krouse, 799 A.2d 835, 838-39 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002).
60. Commonwealth v. Williams, 832 A.2d 962, 966-67 (Pa. 2003) (citing Williams I,
733 A.2d at 602).
61. Id. at 966-67.
62. Id.
63. Williams, 832 A.2d at 966.
64. Todd, supra note 48, at 533.
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D. What Experts in Pennsylvania Typically Rely upon in Determining
Sexually Violent Predator Status
Although there is no statutory enumeration of the permissible bases
of an expert's opinion testimony in Megan's Law hearings, there seems
to be a pattern as to what experts typically rely upon. Ideally, an expert
will interview defendants 65 and/or perform polygraph tests.66  Experts
also base their opinions on published studies that predict the likelihood
of recidivist behavior given the defendant's prior conduct as evidenced in
the record.67 Furthermore, experts rely upon reports conducted by third
parties employed in psychiatric facilities that tend to show sexually
deviant personality traits of the offender.6 8
E. What Experts in Other Jurisdictions Rely upon in Determining
Sexually Violent Predator Status Under Megan's Law
Other jurisdictions allow experts to base their opinion testimony in
Megan's Law hearings on third party records that contain hearsay
69statements. In some of these jurisdictions, sexually violent predator
case law requires the underlying bases of expert testimony to satisfy a
reliability standard.7 °
For example, in People v. Otto, the Supreme Court of California
considered whether expert testimony based on pre-sentence reports that
65. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Prince, 876 A.2d 988, 996-97 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005);
Commonwealth v. Meals, 842 A.2d 448, 454 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (noting that the expert
did not interview the defendant). The court recognized that it did not intend to suggest
that a sexually violent predator designation cannot be met when the defendant refuses a
personal evaluation with a member of the Assessment Board. Meals, 842 A.2d at 454.
Nevertheless, the court concluded that the defendant was not a sexually violent predator.
Id.
66. See Krouse, 799 A.2d at 841-42.
67. Id. In absence of an interview or a polygraph test, the expert based his opinion
"specifically on the finding that individuals who have erections to males 'are more likely
to recidivate than others that have erections to young girls."' Id. However, the court
concluded that the record did not establish that Krouse had erections to males. Id.; see
also Meals, 842 A.2d at 453 (noting that expert's diagnosis of pedophilia was based upon
facts in the record and in published studies).
68. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bey, 841 A.2d 562, 565 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004)
(stating that the expert based his opinion, in part, on a court-ordered pre-sentence report
by the Allegheny County Behavior Clinic which offered a diagnostic impression of"Axis
I Paraphilia Narcissistic Traits Disorder"); Commonwealth v. Carter, 821 A.2d 601, 606-
08 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (noting that the expert based his opinion, in part, on juvenile
psychiatric evaluations and discharge summaries); Commonwealth v. Kopicz, 840 A.2d
342, 352 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (noting that the expert based his opinion, in part, on
psychiatric evaluations).
69. See, e.g., People v. Otto, 26 P.3d. 1061 (Cal. 2001).
70 See id
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contained multiple layers of hearsay was sufficiently reliable to commit
the defendant to a state hospital under California's Sexually Violent
Predator Act.71 Under California Law, in sexually violent predator
commitment proceedings, Section 6600(a)(3) allows the use of hearsay
statements in police reports to show the details of the underlying
offense. 72 In Otto, the defendant alleged that the use of the pre-sentence
reports violated his right to due process.73 In evaluating whether the
hearsay statements used in Otto's sexually violent predator commitment
proceeding were sufficiently reliable, the court considered a number of
factors including the following: (1) the context in which the statements
appeared, (2) transcripts from any preliminary hearing or trial held
regarding the predicate conviction, (3) any indicia that the defendant
challenged the accuracy of the hearsay statements at the underlying
criminal proceeding, and (4) the circumstances surrounding the making
of the statements such as spontaneity and consistent repetition, the
mental state of the declarant, and whether the hearsay statements were
corroborated.74
In affirming Otto's commitment, the court approved of the expert's
reliance on the pre-sentence reports that contained hearsay statements.75
The court emphasized that Otto was convicted of a crime to which the
hearsay statements related.76 In addition, Otto admitted that the pre-
sentence reports accurately reflected the factual basis for his guilty plea
of the predicate offense and did not contain any unproven allegations.77
In contrast to California, Ohio does not enumerate factors for courts
to consider in determining whether the underlying bases of the expert's
opinion testimony are sufficiently reliable in the Megan's Law context.78
Cook was convicted of one count of gross sexual imposition, which arose
from sexual contact with a child.79 In reversing the appellate court, the
Supreme Court of Ohio held that the trial court did not err in conducting
Cook's sexually violent predator hearing by relying on pre-sentence
investigation reports containing hearsay. 80 The Court noted that Cook
did not challenge the accuracy of the pre-sentence investigation reports.
81
71. Id. at 1067-70.
72. Id. at 1065; see also CAL. WELF. & INST. § 6600(a)(3) (2005).
73. Otto, 26 P.3d. at 1067.
74. Id. at 1067-68.
75. Id. at 1071.
76. Id. at 1068.
77. See id.
78. State v. Cook, 700 N.E.2d 570, 586-88 (Ohio 1998).
79. State v. Cook, No. 1-97-21, 1997 WL 452014, at *1 (Ohio App. 3d Aug. 7,
1997).
80. Cook, 700 N.E.2d at 586-87.
81. See Cook, 700 N.E.2d at 587. But cf. Commonwealth v. Leddington, No. 01-
0622 1, slip op. at 3 (Pa. C.P. Bucks Aug. 8, 2005) (stating that Leddington challenged the
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In its decision, the Court analogized a sexually violent predator hearing
to a sentencing hearing since both occur after the offender has been
convicted of the underlying offense.82 Since the Ohio Rules of Evidence
in both kinds of proceedings do not apply,83 reliable hearsay, such as
police reports, may be used. 84 The Court did not explain what that basic
reliability standard entails.85  Thus, in Ohio, within due process
constraints, the trial court has discretion to consider all cogent evidence
on the issues, including hearsay evidence, so long as the evidence
satisfies a basic reliability standard.86
In Massachusetts, experts in sexually dangerous commitment
proceedings 87 are prohibited from relying on otherwise inadmissible
hearsay police reports.88 For instance, in Commonwealth v. Bladsa, two
psychiatrists testified that the defendant engaged in sexual offenses. 89
Their testimony was based upon police reports containing hearsay
statements.9" The court held that the expert testimony was inadmissible
hearsay. 91
The Superior Court of New Jersey in In re Civil Commitment of
A.E.F, affirmed the defendant's commitment due to his sexually deviant
acts.92 In dicta, the court addressed whether experts should be able to
accuracy of "unproven allegations" contained in the probable cause affidavit or other law
enforcement documents).
82. Id. at 584.
83. Id. at 587 (noting that sexually violent predator hearings, since they occur after
the offender has been convicted of the underlying criminal offense, are exempt from the
Ohio Rules of Evidence due to their similarity to sentencing and probation hearings); cf
Commonwealth v. Butler, 760 A.2d 384, 388-89 (Pa. 2000) (noting that evidence
presented at sexually violent predator proceedings are not specifically subject to the
Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence).
84. Cook, 700 N.E.2d at 587.
85. See id. at 587.
86. Id.
87. Brian M. Epstein, Note, Megan's Law: How Should the State of Massachusetts
Apply Its Sex Offender Registry Laws in Light of Other Jurisdictions?, 28 NEw ENG. J.
ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 247, 250-51 (2002). A person classified as a sexually
dangerous person qualifies as a sexual offender. Id. at 251. Those who qualify as sex
offenders are then classified by the Massachusetts Sex Offender Registry Board based on
the likelihood of their potential recidivist behavior. Id. Although a sexually dangerous
commitment proceeding in Massachusetts is not analogous in all respects to sexually
violent predator hearings, the basic idea of both proceedings is that the resulting
characterization of the defendant relies, in large part, on expert testimony. See id.
88. Commonwealth v. Bladsa, 288 N.E.2d 813, 814 (Mass. 1972).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.; cf Commonwealth v. Markvart, 771 N.E.2d 778, 782-84 (Mass. 2002)
(noting that the underlying facts contained in police reports and witness statements from
a nol prossed case may be used as bases for an expert's testimony so long as the
appropriate witnesses are questioned in court).
92. In re Civil Commitment of A.E.F., 873 A.2d 604, 614-15 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
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rely upon unproven allegations in designating a defendant a sexually
violent predator in need of involuntary civil commitment. 93 The court
noted that had the unproven allegations provided a significant building
block in the expert's opinion testimony, the court would have faced a
troubling issue. According to the court, significant state action, such as
a sexually violent predator commitment, "cannot and should not be based
on unproven allegations of misconduct." 95 Even though the unproven
allegations were the victim's sworn grand jury testimony, the statements
were still unproven, and "more significantly," were "not subject to cross-
examination by the accused. 9 6
F. The Confrontation Clause and Megan's Law
Regardless of jurisdiction, when experts rely on unproven
allegations in Megan's Law hearings, there exists the potential for a
violation of the offender's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. 97
The Supreme Court recently addressed the right to confrontation as
it relates to out-of-court statements. In Crawford v. Washington,98 the
Court held that testimonial statements, regardless of their
trustworthiness, are inadmissible unless the declarant is unavailable and
the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant of
the statement. 99 A testimonial statement was not fully defined by the
Court.'00 Nevertheless, the Court did state that testimonial statements, at
minimum, include those statements made during police interrogations. '01
Although the Crawford Court addressed the issue of admitting
Div. 2005).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 614.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to... be confronted with the witnesses against him .... Id.
98. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
99. Id. at 68. The Court emphasized that the cross-examination process helps to
ensure the use of sufficiently reliable evidence. Specifically, the Court stated that:
Where testimonial statements are involved, we do not think the Framers meant
to leave the Sixth Amendment's protection to the vagaries of the rules of
evidence, much less to amorphous notions of 'reliability.' ... Admitting
statements deemed reliable by a Judge is fundamentally at odds with the right
of confrontation. To be sure, the Clause's ultimate goal is to ensure reliability
of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It
commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a
particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61.
100. Id. at 68.
101. Id.
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hearsay statements into evidence'0 2 and did not consider the issue of
expert reliance on hearsay statements, the rationale of Crawford seems to
apply in the Megan's Law context.'0 3 The court in Leddington invoked
Crawford in concluding that the defendant was denied his right to
confrontation when he was not given the opportunity to cross-examine
the detective who produced the police report that contained hearsay
statements. 0 4 Moreover, New Jersey courts, albeit in dictum, have noted
that it is troublesome for experts to rely on hearsay statements contained
in police reports that are not subject to cross-examination.10 5
III. Analysis
A. Experts in Pennsylvania's Megan's Law Hearings Should be
Banned from Relying on Records that Contain Unproven Allegations
It can be inferred from Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence 703 and 705
that expert testimony must satisfy a reliability standard. 0 6 While it is
recognized that an expert may base his or her opinion on facts lacking in
his or her first-hand knowledge, 0 7 the facts must be supported by
evidence in the record.10 8  Fulfilling this requirement can become
problematic in the Megan's Law context where expert opinion testimony
is based upon police reports that contain unproven allegations that have
not been pled guilty to nor are substantiated by other evidence in the
record.10 9 Therefore, the issue of what can be used as reliable bases for
an expert's testimony in the Megan's Law context deserves careful
consideration, since sexually violent predator designations carry serious,
life-long repercussions for the defendant." 10
Experts in Pennsylvania are encouraged to base their opinion
102. Id. at 38.
103. Commonwealth v. Leddington, No. 01-0622 1, slip op. at 10-11 (Pa. C.P. Bucks
Aug. 8, 2005).
104. Id.
105. See, e.g., In re Civil Commitment of A.E.F., 873 A.2d 604, 614 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2005); In re Civil Commitment of E.S.T., 854 A.2d 936, 943-46 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2004).
106. See PA. R. EVID. 703; PA. R. EVID. 705.
107. See Commonwealth v. Thomas, 282 A.2d 693, 698-99 (Pa. 1971).
108. E.g., Newcomer v. Workmen's Comp. Appeal Bd., 692 A.2d 1062, 1066 (Pa.
1997); Milan v. Commonwealth Dep't of Transp., 620 A.2d 721, 727 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1993) (discussing that expert testimony properly admitted based upon a police accident
report not admitted into evidence since trooper's testimony based upon the report became
part of the record).
109. Commonwealth v. Krouse, 799 A.2d 835, 846 (Bowes, J., concurring);
Commonwealth v. Leddington, No. 01-06221, slip op. at 8 (Pa. C.P. Bucks Aug. 8,
2005).
110. Commonwealth v. Williams, 733 A.2d 593, 607 (Pa. 1999).
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testimony upon all relevant information in determining whether the
offender is a sexually violent predator."' However, the aforementioned
case law 1 2 presupposes that the relevant information upon which the
expert bases his or her opinion is true, or at minimum, not undermined or
contradicted by other evidence in the record. The clear and convincing
evidence standard used by the trial court in determining a sexually
violent predator designation is not an easy standard to meet."
13
Therefore, when an expert bases his or her opinion primarily on
unproven allegations, the trial court should not hold that the
Commonwealth has proved by clear and convincing evidence that the
offender is a sexually violent predator." 4 This may explain the recent
Pennsylvania trend in which appellate courts are reversing trial courts'
designations of defendants as sexually violent predators." 5
When an expert discloses the bases of his or her expert opinion,"
16
and the expert relied upon unproven allegations, appellate courts become
skeptical of the expert's overall testimony. 1 7 Sexually violent predator
hearings are "not perfunctory affairs in which parties and judge merely
review the trial or guilty plea colloquy proceedings. Rather, they are
evidence gathering mechanisms."" 8 As gatekeepers, trial court judges
seem to demand some minimal level of reliability for the bases of expert
opinion testimony.' 9
111. See Commonwealth v. Carter, 821 A.2d 601, 607 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).
112. See supra text accompanying note 41-2.
113. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9795.4(e)(3) (2005); see also Commonwealth v. Pitts, No.
1636 EDA 2002, slip op. at 3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) ("[T]he clear and convincing standard
requires evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of
fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in
issue.").
114. Pitts, No. 1636 EDA 2002, slip op. at 18. The Assessment Board did not
interview the defendant, and so was unable to show, by clear and convincing evidence, a
link between the defendant's disorder and predatory sexually violent behavior. Id.; see
Commonwealth v. Plucinski, 868 A.2d 20, 27 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005). The Assessment
Board did not properly designate the defendant a sexually violent predator because "the
Board's diagnosis of [Defendant's mental abnormality] was to some extent undermined
by the Board's expert's own assessment of Pulcinski." Id.; Commonwealth v. Krouse,
799 A.2d 835, 841-42 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002). The evidence was insufficient to conclude
that Krouse suffered from a personality disorder, in light of the fact that: (1) the Board
did not interview Krouse, and (2) Krouse's expert interviewed Krouse and determined
that he did not have a personality disorder. Id.; Commonwealth v. Meals, 842 A.2d 448,
452 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004). The evidence was insufficient to designate the defendant a
sexually violent predator. Id. "[D]ifficulties [in evaluating the defendant] do not excuse
the Commonwealth from meeting its burden of proof." Id. at 453.
115. See supra text accompanying note 114.
116. PA. R. EVID. 705. "The expert must testify as to the facts or data on which the
opinion or inference is based." Id.
117. See supra text accompanying note 114.
118. Commonwealth v. Sanford, 863 A.2d 428, 431 (Pa. 2004).
119. Commonwealth v. Leddington, No. 01-06221, slip op. at 9 (Pa. C.P. Bucks Aug.
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Nevertheless, Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 703 further
complicates matters because it allows an expert to base his or her opinion
on evidence "of a type... relied upon by experts in the particular
field., 120 By necessity, Assessment Board experts rely upon third party
reports in determining sexually violent predator status, especially with
uncooperative defendants who refuse interviews with experts.
121
However, this is certainly not the preferred method of gathering evidence
for psychiatrists, psychologists, and criminal justice experts. 122 In fact,
this method is not reasonable 123 in light of the consequences and
stigmatizing effects 124 of a sexually violent predator designation.
As concurring Judge Bowes in Krouse pointed out, there is too
much at stake in sexually violent predator hearings to allow experts to
base their opinion testimony upon police reports that contain unproven
allegations consistently denied by the defendant. 125  Judge Bowes
analogized the situation to that of a sentencing court that relies upon
unverified hearsay outside the record when imposing a sentence. 126 In
the sentencing context, the court is banned from relying upon allegations
only established through hearsay.1 27 A similar conclusion was reached in
a criminal proceeding where the court concluded that the detective's
written account of what a third party witness had told the detective is the
type of unreliable, out-of-court declaration that the hearsay rule was
designed to exclude. 1
28
8, 2005).
120. PA. R. EvID. 703.
121. Commonwealth v. Meals, 842 A.2d 448,450 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004).
122. See discussion supra Part II(D).
123. PA. R. EvID. 703. "[If not admissible into evidence, the facts or data] ... upon
which an expert bases an opinion [must be]... of the type reasonably relied upon." Id.
124. Commonwealth v. Williams, 733 A.2d 593, 607 (Pa. 1999).
125. Commonwealth v. Krouse, 799 A.2d 835, 844-45 (Bowes, J., concurring).
126. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Berrigan, 535 A.2d 91, 106 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987)).
127. Berrigan, 535 A.2d at 174-75. The sentencing court attributed to the appellant a
serious act of misconduct of which there was no evidence in the pre-sentencing reports or
in other portions of the trial record. Id. at 174. The sentence took into consideration the
judge's statement that ". . . one of the [defendants] called several jurors several times to
hassle these jurors as to why they returned the verdict they did." Id. at 175. When the
appellant interrupted the judge to deny and verify the judge's allegation, the judge failed
to support his allegation with a defendant's name. Id. On appeal, the Superior Court
emphasized that "a judge may not rely on unverified hearsay outside the record in
imposing judgment of sentence." Id. Thus, the Superior Court exercised its authority as
gatekeeper to conclude that since the judge "relied on an allegation of uncertain origin
which the appellants had no real opportunity to contest, the judgments of sentence [could
not] stand." Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Smithton, 631 A.2d 1053, 1057 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1993) (noting that sentencing courts are prohibited from relying upon facts of a crime
that the jury has discredited).
128. Commonwealth v. Baez, 431 A.2d 909, 910-13 (Pa. 1981). Baez, who was
convicted of first-degree murder, appealed his life imprisonment sentence. Id. at 910.
The Commonwealth read directly from a written statement allegedly given by Castillo, a
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Thus, given the scenarios in Commonwealth v. Berrigan and
Commonwealth v. Baez, 129 experts in the Megan's Law context should be
banned from relying upon police reports and/or probable cause affidavits
that contain unproven allegations in determining a sexually violent
predator designation.130  This should especially be the case where the
offender consistently denies the allegations. 13' Despite the possibility of
stigmatizing effects in the contexts of sentencing and other criminal
proceedings, there exists a greater potential for long-term, severe
stigmatization in Megan's Law proceedings. 132
B. An Offender's Right to Confrontation is Violated When Experts in
Megan's Law Hearings Rely on Records that Contain Unproven
Allegations
Assuming that the reasoning in Crawford applies in the Megan's
Law context,' 33 when experts rely upon unproven allegations in
designating an offender a sexually violent predator, the offender may not
have the opportunity to cross-examine the statements even though the
third party to the incident, to a police detective. Id. at 911. In cross-examining Baez, the
Commonwealth read portions of Castillo's statement to Baez and asked whether those
assertions were true. Id. Like the appellant in Berrigan, Baez denied the unproven
allegations. Id. Castillo's statement to the police was characterized as "an extrajudicial
written statement which [incorporated] an extrajudicial oral statement." Id. The
detective never verified the veracity of his written account. Id. Thus, similar to the
judge's allegations in Berrigan, nothing suggested that the detective's written account
was "[authentic or reliable]." Id. The supreme court concluded that the detective's
written account "is precisely the type of unreliable out-of-court declaration the hearsay
rule was designed to exclude." Id.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 127-28.
130. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Leddington, No. 01-06221, slip op. at 12 (Pa. C.P.
Bucks Aug. 8, 2005); Commonwealth v. Krouse, 799 A.2d 835, 846 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2002) (Bowes, J., concurring). The court stressed that opinions of experts cannot be
premised on unreliable allegations that are, in effect, mere suspicion and conjecture. Id.
at 846.
131. See Leddington, No. 01-06221, slip op. at 8.
132. See Hopbell, supra note 6. "Megan's Law punishes sex offenders that are
required to register in that it subjects them to the possibility of public ridicule, ostracism,
job discrimination, housing discrimination, and other forms of ongoing punishment." Id.
at 342. See also Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 495 (1980) (noting that the defendant has
an interest in not being arbitrarily classified as well as not being subjected to unwelcome
treatment).
133. In re Civil Commitment of E.S.T., 854 A.2d 936, 944 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2004). The defendant appealed from a judgment committing him to the Special
Treatment Unit pursuant to New Jersey's Sexually Violent Predator Act. Id. at 938. The
Superior Court noted that since Defendant's proceeding was civil, the Sixth Amendment
right to confrontation did not directly apply, but further noted that a sexually violent
predator commitment hearing is "pseudo-criminal in nature and should provide as much
procedural protection to the committee as the circumstances permit." Id.
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declarant is available.1 34  Lack of cross-examination violates the
offender's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.1 35 This potential
violation further supports banning experts from relying on unproven
allegations in designating an offender a sexually violent predator.
It may be argued that an offender has waived his right to
confrontation when he or she pleads guilty to the underlying criminal
conviction. However, this argument is likely to fail when unproven
allegations are used by an expert in a Megan's Law hearing, which is a
proceeding separate and apart from the underlying criminal conviction
proceeding.1 36 Even if an offender has pled guilty to the underlying
criminal conviction, the offender has not waived his or her right to
confrontation in the separate hearing that will determine whether the
offender is a sexually violent predator.
As previously discussed, Megan's Law hearings are conducted
without a jury. 13 7 Thus, in fairness to the offender, he or she should be
given an opportunity to confront the declarant(s) of unproven allegations
that an expert relies on in determining a sexually violent predator
designation. This procedural safeguard will help to ensure that an
expert's opinion is sufficiently reliable.
C. Pennsylvania Should Incorporate a Factor Analysis Test into
Megan's Law to Determine Whether the Underlying Bases of an
Expert's Opinion Testimony are Reliable
Given the potential for stigmatizing effects 138 and constitutional
violations, 139 judges and experts in Pennsylvania's Megan's Law
hearings should be skeptical of relying on hearsay statements in
designating an offender a sexually violent predator. Based upon
practices in other jurisdictions, Pennsylvania would be well advised to
incorporate into its Megan's Law a factor analysis test that trial judges
would use in determining whether hearsay statements that underlie
expert testimony are reliable. 140  Trial judges will maintain their
discretionary powers since the ultimate sexual violent predator
designation will rest with them.1 4 1 The factor analysis test will help to
prevent an offender from being erroneously designated a sexually violent
predator.
134. See Leddington, No. 01-06221, slip op. at 10-11.
135. Id.
136. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9795.4(e)(3) (2005).
137. See discussion supra Part II(C).
138. Commonwealth v. Williams, 733 A.2d 593, 607 (Pa. 1999).
139. See supra Part Ill(B).
140. See, e.g., People v. Otto, 26 P.3d. 1061, 1067-68 (Cal. 2001).
141. See supra text accompanying note 59.
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The factor analysis test should require the expert, while testifying,
to highlight the bases for his or her specific findings for each statutory
factor detailed in section 9795.4(b) during the Megan's Law designation
proceeding.1 42  In substance, this factor analysis test in Pennsylvania
could incorporate some of the more important factors used by the
Supreme Court of California,143 such as any indicia that the defendant
challenged the hearsay statements relied upon by the expert, whether any
independent evidence exists to corroborate the veracity of the hearsay
statements, and under what circumstances the hearsay statements were
made. 44
In practice, it would be crucial for the trial judge, in deciding
whether there is sufficient evidence to support the existence of the
statutory factors listed in Section 9795.4(b), 145 to consider the underlying
bases of the expert's testimony. For example, in Leddington, the
defendant sought to exclude any opinions based on allegations that on
the night of the incident in question he molested another young victim
and threatened the victim after the assault. 146  An expert used this
evidence to support a finding that the following factors in Section
9795.4(b)(1) were met: (i) that the offense involved multiple victims and
(vi) that the offense included a display of unusual cruelty by the
individual during the commission of the crime. 147 Under the proposed
factor analysis test, the aforementioned evidence proffered by the expert,
while the expert is still on the stand, would not be examined solely to
determine whether the evidence supports the existence of the
aforementioned statutory factor(s) under Section 9795.4(b)(1).148  In
addition, the underlying bases of the proffered testimony would also be
examined for reliability. For example, in a case like Leddington, the trial
judge, after inquiring to which statutory factor the proffered evidence
relates, could further question whether the defendant challenged the truth
of the hearsay evidence, whether there is independent evidence to
corroborate the veracity of the hearsay evidence, and the circumstances
under which the hearsay statements were made. 
49
Requiring a factor analysis test is reasonable in light of the process
used to determine whether an offender deserves a sexually violent
predator designation. A comprehensive list of factors to determine
142. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9795.4(b) (2005); see supra text accompanying note 52.
143. See supra text accompanying note 74.
144. Id. at 1067-68.
145. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9795.4(b) (2005).
146. Commonwealth v. Leddington, No. 01-06221, slip op. at 3 (Pa. C.P. Bucks Aug.
8, 2005).
147. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9795.4(b) (2005).
148. Id.
149. See Leddington, No. 01-0622 1, slip op. at 8; see also Otto, 26 P.3d. at 1067-68.
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whether an offender is a sexually violent predator is set forth in Section
9795.4(b). 5 ' Since these factors determine the appropriateness of a
sexually violent predator classification, it makes sense to subject the
bases relied upon by experts in determining the existence of the factors
listed in Section 9795.4(b) to a factor analysis test.
Arguably, Pennsylvania is already moving in the direction of
requiring experts to disclose the bases of their testimony. For instance, at
least one Pennsylvania court has stated that although Megan's Law does
not specifically require courts to make findings regarding the factors
enumerated in Section 9795.4(b), it would be in the best interests of trial
courts to include on the record specific reasons for finding the defendant
to be a sexually violent predator in relation to the statutory factors.1
5'
The Supreme Court of Ohio has suggested a similar approach.' 52 Thus, if
future Pennsylvania courts follow the lead of Krouse, courts may
continue reading beyond the plain language of Megan's Law and suggest
that experts make findings regarding the statutory factors listed in
Section 9795.4(b). Thus, requiring an additional step of disclosure of the
underlying bases of expert testimony seems reasonable.
It would not be unduly burdensome to require the expert-to identify
the underlying factual bases supporting the existence (or non-existence)
of each statutory factor used to designate a sexually violent predator.
The expert is in the best position to explain what he or she relied on in
reaching his or her decision. The only additional step during the
proceeding would be for the expert to reveal the underlying bases to the
trial judge. Then, if there was a dispute as to whether the expert was
relying on unproven allegations, the dispute could be addressed by the
defendant expediently before the trial judge. Thus, the trial judge would
be aware of the controversy and could take timely action to remedy the
situation. Although it may seem as if this extra step would unnecessarily
prolong Megan's Law hearings, it would help to provide a complete
record for appellate review and may even limit the number of appeals.
53
150. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9795.4(b) (2005).
151. Commonwealth v. Krouse, 799 A.2d 835, 842-43 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002).
152. Ohio v. Eppinger 743 N.E.2d 881, 888-89 (Ohio 2001). The Ohio Supreme
Court recently defined the specific findings that should be included on the record for a
complete appellate review based on Ohio's Megan's Law. Id. "The trial court should
consider the statutory factors listed in R.C. 2950.09(B)(2), and should discuss on the
record the particular evidence and factors upon which it relies in making its
determination regarding the likelihood of recidivism .. " Id.
153. The more often that the Commonwealth meets the clear and convincing evidence
standard in Megan's Law hearings, the less often subsequent appeals will follow because
the standard of review favors the Commonwealth:
The appropriate standard of review regarding the sufficiency of the evidence is
"whether the evidence admitted at trial and all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom, when viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as
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Especially given the recent Pennsylvania appellate court trend of
reversing sexual violent predator designations, 154 this extra step may
become necessary and may even relieve overburdened dockets.
This additional procedural safeguard of requiring the underlying
bases of experts' testimony to satisfy a factor analysis test is reasonable
given the underlying rationale of Megan's Law II. As previously
discussed, the burden of refuting a sexually violent predator designation
rested with the defendant under Megan's Law 1. 155 Megan's Law I failed
Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny since it did not provide the offender
with a presumption of innocence. 5 6 To provide the offender with the
"full panoply... of due process guarantees,"' 157 under Megan's Law II
the burden of proving that the offender deserves a sexually violent
predator designation rests with the Commonwealth. 158  Even today,
constitutional controversies continue to surround Megan's Law II.159
Thus, it is logical to subject the expert's opinion to a high level of
scrutiny given that part of the underlying rationale of Megan's Law II is
to provide the offender with due process protection.
In addition, it is particularly important to provide the offender with
due process protection given the nature of Megan's Law hearings. A
sexually violent predator designation in Pennsylvania is not an objective
determination. 160  Instead, the classifications require a subjective
assessment of an offender's potential future dangerousness, which
includes a greater risk of error than objective determinations.
161
Therefore, it makes sense to require experts to disclose the underlying
bases of their opinion testimony. 162
Moreover, expert testimony by its very nature raises special
concerns. The use of expert testimony necessarily involves a
determination by the trier of fact of what to believe.' 63 Given that at least
the verdict winner, is sufficient to support all the elements of the offenses." As
a reviewing court, we "may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment
for that of the fact-finder."
Krouse, 799 A.2d 837-38. Thus, judicial resources are conserved when the clear and
convincing evidence standard is met. See id.
154. See supra note 114.
155. Todd, supra note 48, at 531.
156. Todd, supra note 48, at 531-32.
157. Commonwealth v. Williams, 832 A.2d 962, 966 (Pa. 2003).
158. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9795.4(e)(3) (2005).
159. Todd, supra note 48, at 533.
160. Commonwealth v. Krouse, 799 A.2d 835, 840 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002).
161. Id.
162. See PA. R. EVID. 705 Cmt. The rule, as interpreted by case law, "requires
disclosure of the facts used by the expert in forming an opinion." See id.; Kozak v.
Struth, 531 A.2d 420, 423 (Pa. 1987).
163. GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 12.2 (3d ed.
1996).
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one Pennsylvania court encouraged the expert to state the specific facts
upon which he relied upon to support the existence (or non-existence) of
the statutory factors listed in Section 9795.4(b), 164 judges should not have
too much difficulty in identifying the facts underlying an expert's
opinion.165 However, judges also need to decide which, if any, of the
conclusions drawn by experts should be accepted as true.
166
Pennsylvania should adopt a factor analysis test to ensure that
expert testimony is reliable in Megan's Law hearings. Conclusions, like
sexually violent predator designations, imply that the underlying set of
facts relied upon are true. 167 This may or may not be the case, however,
given the underlying sources of information relied upon by the expert in
reaching his or her conclusion. The proposed factor analysis test would
help to ensure that judges rule based on a fair assessment of the expert's
opinion, since experts would be required to reveal not only the specific
facts used to reach their opinion, but also the underlying bases of the
specific facts used to reach their opinion.
Even the Federal Rules have acknowledged that in appropriate
circumstances, experts should disclose the underlying bases of their
opinion testimony.' 68 Federal Rule of Evidence 703, like Pennsylvania
Rule of Evidence 703, allows experts to rely upon facts or data
"reasonably relied upon" by other experts in the field.1 69 The intent of
Federal Rule 703, like Pennsylvania Rule 703, is to be generous in
admitting expert testimony. 170 Federal Rule 703 differs from
Pennsylvania Rule 703 in that it was amended to block the proponent
from disclosing to the jury "otherwise inadmissible" facts or data
underlying expert testimony unless the balancing test of Federal Rule
403 where the probative value of disclosure "substantially outweighs"
prejudicial effect, is satisfied. 171 Perhaps, in addition to the proposed
factor analysis test, Pennsylvania could limit disclosure of the underlying
factual bases of experts' testimony. However, Pennsylvania Rule of
Evidence 403 differs from Federal Rule of Evidence 403 in that the
Pennsylvania version eliminates the word "substantially. ,1 72 It follows
that Pennsylvania's "even" balancing test under its version of Rule 403 is
164. See discussion supra note 15 1.




169. FED. R. EvID. 703.
170. See GRAHAM, EVIDENCE, § 12.2, at 561-62.
171. FED R. EvID. 703; FED. R. EVID. 403; CHRISTOPHER MUELLER AND LAIRD
KJRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULES 606 (5th ed., Aspen Publishers 2004).
172. PA. R. EVID. 403 Cmt.
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easier to satisfy than its federal counterpart. 73 Thus, Pennsylvania's
limits on disclosure could occur so long as the balancing test articulated
in Pennsylvania's version of Rule 403 is satisfied.
IV. Conclusion
In the Megan's Law context, experts should not be permitted to rely
on hearsay statements that contain unproven allegations in determining
whether an offender should be designated a sexually violent predator. In
determining whether hearsay statements contain unproven allegations,
Pennsylvania's Megan's Law should be amended to include a factor
analysis test to help ensure that the underlying bases of an expert's
testimony are sufficiently reliable.
Pennsylvania's Megan's Law does not enumerate the permissible
bases for an expert's opinion. Case law in contexts other than Megan's
Law and the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence imply that a basic
reliability standard must be satisfied in order to designate an offender a
sexually violent predator.174  However, this vague standard has not
provided trial courts with much guidance, as evidenced in Krouse and
Leddington. Moreover, a number of trial courts in Pennsylvania that
have designated offenders sexually violent predators have been
overturned by appellate courts. 175 Thus, Pennsylvania's Megan's Law
should be amended to include a factor analysis test. The factor analysis
test can be modeled after those procedures employed in other
jurisdictions, such as California. With the adoption of these procedural
safeguards, there is a greater likelihood that a sexually violent predator
designation will be correct and will avoid potential constitutional
violations. Trial court judges will be able to retain their discretion, as the
final decision of an offender's designation will ultimately rest in their
hands. One of the only drawbacks of this proposal is the probable
increase in time of Megan's Law hearings. However, this is a small
price to pay to protect offenders from an erroneous designation. It is
crucial for our judicial system to maintain safeguards to ensure that
evidence remains reliable.
173. See PA. R. EvID. 403. But see FED R. EvID. 403.
174. See supra Part I(B).
175. See supra text accompanying note 114.
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